

7TH ANNUAL ITWEB
SECURITY
SUMMIT

REINVENTING INFORMATION SECURITY
WHERE TRUSTED TECHNOLOGIES HAVE FAILED YOU

**HTML5 Unbound: A Security &
Privacy Drama**

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A Drama in Four Parts

- The Meaning & Mythology of HTML5
- Security From Design
- Security (and Privacy) From HTML5
- Design, Doom & Destiny

“This specification defines the 5th major revision of the core language of the World Wide Web: the Hypertext Markup Language (HTML). In this version, new features are introduced... new elements are introduced... attention has been given to defining performance criteria for user agents in an effort to improve interoperability.”

Is my ~~Geocities~~ site secure?



~~HTML4~~



~~Web 2.0~~



HTML5

The Path to HTML5

3350 B.C. Cuneiform enables stone markup languages.

July 1984 “Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination...”
Neuromancer, p. 0x33.

Dec 1990 CERN httpd starts serving HTML.

Nov 1995 HTML 2.0 standardized in RFC 1866.

Dec 1999 HTML 4.01 finalized.

HTML5. Meaning vs. Mythology

<!doctype html>

Cross Origin

Resource Sharing

WebSocket API

Web Storage

Web Workers

Social [_____]

[_____] as a Service

Web 2.0++

Flash, Silverlight

CSRF

Clickjacking



“Default Secure” Takes Time

The image shows a screenshot of a web browser displaying a PHP manual page titled "Using Register Globals". The page has a table of contents on the left and a main content area. Three callout boxes with arrows point to specific parts of the page:

- Nov 2009**: Points to the "Warning" section, which states: "This feature has been **DEPRECATED** as of PHP 5.3.0 and **REMOVED** as of PHP 5.4.0."
- Mar 2012**: Points to the same "Warning" section.
- Apr 2002**: Points to the main text paragraph, which discusses the controversial change in the default value of the `register_globals` directive from ON to OFF in PHP 4.2.0.

Using Register Globals

Warning

This feature has been **DEPRECATED** as of PHP 5.3.0 and **REMOVED** as of PHP 5.4.0.

Perhaps the most controversial change in PHP is when the default value for the PHP directive [register_globals](#) went from ON to OFF in PHP » [4.2.0](#). Reliance on this directive was quite common and many people didn't even know it existed and assumed it's just how PHP works. This page will explain how one can write insecure code with this directive but keep in mind that the directive itself isn't insecure but rather it's the misuse of it.

“Default Insecure” Is Enduring

Dec 2005

Securing your Rails application |

1.2 The solution

Active Record provides two ways of securing sensitive attributes from being overwritten by malicious users that change the form. The first is `attr_protected` that denies mass-assignment the right to change the named parameters.

Using `attr_protected`, we can secure the User models like this:

```
class User < ActiveRecord::Base
  attr_protected :approved, :role
end
```

This will ensure that on doing `User.create(params['user'])` both `params['user']['approved']` and `params['user']['role']` will be ignored. You'll have to manually set them like this:

```
user = User.new(params['user'])
user.approved = sanitize_properly(params['user']['approved'])
user.role     = sanitize_properly(params['user']['role'])
```

Public Key Security Vulnerability and Mitigation

Whitelist all attribute assignment by default. - 06a3a8a - rails/rails

```
railties/lib/rails/generators/rails/app/templates/config/application.rb
... @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ class Application < Rails::Application
58 58   # This will create an empty whitelist of attributes available for mass-assignment
59 59   # in your app. As such, your models will need to explicitly whitelist or blacklist
60 60   # parameters by using an attr_accessible or attr_protected declaration.
61 61   - config.active_record.whitelist_attributes = true
61 61   + config.active_record.whitelist_attributes = true
62 62
63 63   <%= unless options.skip_sprockets? -%>
64 64   # Enable the asset pipeline
```

Mar 2012

“Developer Insecure” Is Eternal

- Advanced Persistent Ignorance

```
sqlmap -- bash
Usage: python ./sqlmap.py [options]

Options:
--version          show program's version number and exit
-h, --help        show this help message and exit
-v VERBOSE        Verbosity level: 0-6 (default 1)

Target:
At least one of these options has to be specified to set the source to
get target urls from

-d DIRECT          Direct connection to the database
-u URL, --url=URL Target url
-l LOGFILE        Parse targets from Burp or WebScarab pro
-m BULKFILE       Scan multiple targets enlisted in a give
-r REQUESTFILE    Load HTTP request from a file
-g GOOGLEDORK     Process Google dork results as target ur
-c CONFIGFILE     Load options from a configuration INI fi

Request:
These options can be used to specify how to connect to the t

--data=DATA       Data string to be sent through POST
--param-del=PDEL  Character used for splitting parameter v
--cookie=COOKIE   HTTP Cookie header
--load-cookies=LOC File containing cookies in Netscape/wget
--cookie-urlencode URL Encode generated cookie injections
--drop-set-cookie Ignore Set-Cookie header from response
--user-agent=AGENT HTTP User-Agent header
--random-agent    Use randomly selected HTTP User-Agent he
--randomize=RPARAM Randomly change value for given paramete
--force-ssl       Force usage of SSL/HTTPS requests
--host=HOST       HTTP Host header
--referer=REFERER HTTP Referer header
--headers=HEADERS Extra headers (e.g. "Accept-Language: fr
--auth-type=ATYPE HTTP authentication type (Basic, Digest
--auth-cred=ACRED HTTP authentication credentials (name:pa
--auth-cert=ACERT HTTP authentication certificate (key_fil
--proxy=PROXY     Use a HTTP proxy to connect to the target
--proxy-cred=PCRED HTTP proxy authentication credentials (n
--ignore-proxy    Ignore system default HTTP proxy
--delay=DELAY     Delay in seconds between each HTTP requ
--timeout=TIMEOUT Seconds to wait before timeout connectio
```

```
MongoDB
A Tiny MongoDB Browser Shell
Just enough to scratch the surface (mini tutorial included)

for(i=0; i<10; i++) { db.scores.save({a: i, exam: 5}) };

Try that, then enter
db.scores.find();
to see if the save succeeded. Since the shell only displays 10 results at time,
you'll need to enter the 'it' command to iterate over the rest.

(enter 'next' when you're ready)

> next

5. Basic Queries
You've already tried a few queries, but let's make them more specific.
How about finding all documents where a == 2:
db.scores.find({a: 2});

Or what about documents where a > 15?
db.scores.find({a: {'$gt': 15}});
```

JavaScript: Client(?!) Code

- The global scope of superglobals
- The prototypes of mass assignment
- The eval() of SQL injection
- The best way to create powerful browser apps
- The main accomplice to HTML5



History of Web Designs

- Cookies
 - Implementation by fiat, not by standard
 - A path of ornamentation, not origin
 - HTTP/HTTPS, JavaScript/non-JavaScript
- Same Origin Policy
 - Access everything, read some things
 - No privilege or all privilege, not least privilege
- User Agent sniffing
- HTTPS
 - Not the default
 - Relies on DNS


The Dramatic Journey to HTML5

- (WAP, WML)
- (XHTML)
- CSRF
- Clickjacking
- <video>
- WebGL
- WebSocket API



Mixing Markup & Methods

HTML2 (1995)




HTML4 (1998)

```
</div>
```

HTML5 Form Validation

```
<input type="email".....  
<input type="url".....  
<input type="text" required...
```

A screenshot of a web form with three input fields. The first two fields are empty. The third field, which is a text input, is highlighted with a red border and contains a vertical cursor. To the right of the third field is a button labeled "Submit Query". Below the third field, a dark grey tooltip box displays the message "Please fill out this field." in white text.

```
<input pattern="[A-Z]+" name="alpha_only" ...  
<input ... autofocus onfocus="..."
```

“Yes, you can re-add that logic server-side, but why would you want to add that kind of logic twice.” -- illustrative mailing list comment from 2011

Defense from Design

- Sandboxing iframes, form submission, javascript execution
 - Improving granularity of Same Origin Policy
- Cross Origin Resource Sharing
 - Better than JSONP
- Content Security Policy
 - Monitor/enforce eases adoption

- Web Storage API
 - Transparent resource
 - Privacy extraction, not SQL injection
- WebSocket API
 - Another vector for launching DoS attacks from the browser
 - Does not confer authentication & authorization to a protocol layered over WebSockets
 - A chance to reinvent protocol vulnerabilities

Reinventing Protocol Vulns

- Prefixed strings
- Identification
- Authorization
- Information leakage
- Replay
- Spoofing
- eval()



More Processing in the Browser

- Same Origin Policy still a coarse-grained control
- Bring HTML5 to HTML4
 - Emulate IndexedDB, etc.
- Leveraging JavaScript's global scope
- DOM-based XSS
- evals, xhrs
- More work for blacklists and filters



Improving Browsers

- Process separation
- Sandboxed plugins
- Bug bounties
- X-Frame-Options
- XSS Auditors
- HTML5 should be the only version number you need

Never Mind the IDN, Here's the...






Mobile: What Design?

- User expectations
 - Who cares about the URL anymore? It's hardly even visible.
- Embedded browser-like features are not embedded browsers
 - Same Origin Policy enforcement
 - Certification verification
- User tracking

Privacy: 1 Billion Reasons To Care

- 📍 • Geolocation
- Supercookies
- Do-Not-Track
- HSTS



soylent Grün ist Menschenfleisch!

Threats, Troubles, Trends

- Frames
 - Sharing, nesting, moving between Origins
- Plugins
 - Outside of sandbox, outside of HTML5
 - Worse security than browsers
- More specs
 - Hardware access, monitoring
- Passwords
 - Plaintext from browser to server, encrypted on server
 - OAuth & OpenID?

JavaScript Libraries

- Ext JS 1.1.1 to 4.0.7
- jQuery 1.0.2 to 1.2.5
- Modernizer 1.1 to 2.5.3
- MooTools 1.1 to 1.4.5
- Prototype 1.3.0 to 1.7.0
- YAHOO 2.2.0 to 2.9.0
- YUI 3.0.0 to 3.4.1



Recognizing Positive Security

- Acknowledges threats intended to counter, and those it doesn't
- Encrypted transport
- Adherence to Same Origin
- Preflight checks for authorization
- Authentication & authorization grants have short lifetimes
- Requires least privilege, least data
- Parsing failures fail, not fix up

HTML5 Is Good For You

- Beware of legacy support for and within old browsers
- Abolish plugins
- Deploy headers: X-Frame-Options, HSTS, CSP
- Data security is better

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Questions?

Thank You!

<http://deadliestwebattacks.com/>

