

# ISSA/OWASP Oyrngpuyrl Cnex

## Graveyards & Zombies: How HTML5 Improves Security. Mostly.

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# Vuln Sematary

“This specification defines the 5th major revision of the core language of the World Wide Web: the Hypertext Markup Language (HTML). In this version, new features have been added to help Web application authors and implementers, based on research and industry best practices, and several changes have been given to defining clear conformance criteria for user agents in an effort to improve interoperability.”

Is my ~~Cococities~~ site secure?



# “They’re coming to get you, Barbara.”

- Death Throes
  - Server-side/browser design available
- Graveyard
  - Server-side/browser design implemented
- Zombies
  - Developers’ brains
- Undying
  - No design available

Clickjacking  
HTML Injection  
HTTP Parameter Pollution (Value Shadowing)  
HTTP Response Splitting  
SQL Injection  
Unencrypted Transport  
XST

# The Path to HTML5

**3350 B.C.** Cuneiform enables stone markup languages.

**July 1984** “Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination...”  
*Neuromancer*, p. 0x33.

Nov 1988 The Morris Worm

**Dec 1990** CERN httpd starts serving HTML.

**Nov 1995** HTML 2.0 standardized in RFC 1866.

Sep 1999 “Perl CGI Problems” in Phrack 55

**Dec 1999** HTML 4.01 finalized.



# “Default Secure” Takes Time

The image shows a screenshot of a web browser displaying a PHP manual page. The browser window title is "PHP: Using Register Globals - Manual". The page content includes a table of contents on the left with "Using Register Globals" highlighted. The main heading is "Using Register Globals". A pink warning box contains the text: "Warning: This feature has been **DEPRECATED** as of PHP 5.3.0 and **REMOVED** as of PHP 5.4.0." Below this, a paragraph discusses the change in the default value of the `register_globals` directive from ON to OFF in PHP 4.2.0. Three callout boxes with arrows point to specific parts of the page: "Nov 2009" points to the warning box, "Mar 2012" points to the word "DEPRECATED", and "Apr 2002" points to the text "in PHP » 4.2.0".

Nov 2009

Mar 2012

**Warning**

This feature has been **DEPRECATED** as of PHP 5.3.0 and **REMOVED** as of PHP 5.4.0.

Perhaps the most controversial change in PHP is when the default value for the PHP directive `register_globals` went from ON to OFF in PHP » 4.2.0. Reliance on this directive was quite common and many people didn't even know it existed and assumed it's just how PHP works. This page will explain how one can write insecure code with this directive but keep in mind that the directive itself isn't insecure but rather it's the misuse of it.

Apr 2002

# “Default Insecure” Is Enduring

Dec 2005

Securing your Rails application |

## 1.2 The solution

Active Record provides two ways of securing sensitive attributes from being overwritten by malicious users that change the form. The first is `attr_protected` that denies mass-assignment the right to change the named parameters.

Using `attr_protected`, we can secure the User models like this:

```
class User < ActiveRecord::Base
  attr_protected :approved, :role
end
```

This will ensure that on doing `User.create(@params['user'])` both `@params['user']['approved']` and `@params['user']['role']` will be ignored. You'll have to manually set them like this:

```
user = User.new(@params['user'])
user.approved = sanitize_properly(@params['user']['approved'])
user.role = sanitize_properly(@params['user']['role'])
```

Public Key Security Vulnerability and Mitigation

## Public Key Security Vulnerability and Mitigation

Subscribe to  
Never miss a

Whitelist all attribute assignment by default. - 06a3a8a - rails/rails

```
raillies/lib/rails/generators/rails/app/templates/config/application.rb
... @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ class Application < Rails::Application
58 58   # This will create an empty whitelist of attributes available for mass-assignment
59 59   # in your app. As such, your models will need to explicitly whitelist or blacklis
60 60   # parameters by using an attr_accessible or attr_protected declaration.
61 61   - # config.active_record.whitelist_attributes = true
61 61   + config.active_record.whitelist_attributes = true
62 62
63 63   <%= unless options.skip_sprockets? -%>
64 64   # Enable the asset pipeline
```

Mar 2012



# “Developer Insecure” Is Eternal

## ■ Advanced Persistent Ignorance

```
sqlmap -- bash
Usage: python ./sqlmap.py [options]

Options:
  --version          show program's version number and exit
  -h, --help        show this help message and exit
  -v VERBOSE        Verbosity level: 0-6 (default 1)

Target:
  At least one of these options has to be specified to set the source to
  get target urls from

  -d DIRECT          Direct connection to the database
  -u URL, --url=URL Target url
  -l LOGFILE         Parse targets from Burp or WebScarab proxy logs
  -m BULKFILE        Scan multiple targets enlisted in a given textual file
  -r REQUESTFILE    Load HTTP request from a file
  -g GOOGLEDORK     Process Google dork results as target urls
  -c CONFIGFILE     Load options from a configuration INI file

Request:
  These options can be used to specify how to connect to the target url

  --data=DATA        Data string to be sent through POST
  --param-del=PDEL   Character used for splitting parameter values
  --cookie=COOKIE    HTTP Cookie header
  --load-cookies=LOC File containing cookies in Netscape/wget format
  --cookie-urlencode URL Encode generated cookie injections
  --drop-set-cookie Ignore Set-Cookie header from response
  --user-agent=AGENT HTTP User-Agent header
  --random-agent     Use randomly selected HTTP User-Agent header
  --randomize=RPARAM Randomly change value for given parameter(s)
  --force-ssl        Force usage of SSL/HTTPS requests
  --host=HOST        HTTP Host header
  --referer=REFERER HTTP Referer header
  --headers=HEADERS Extra headers (e.g. "Accept-Language: fr\nETag: 123")
  --auth-type=ATYPE  HTTP authentication type (Basic, Digest or NTLM)
  --auth-cred=ACRED  HTTP authentication credentials (name:password)
  --auth-cert=ACERT  HTTP authentication certificate (key_file,cert_file)
  --proxy=PROXY      Use a HTTP proxy to connect to the target url
  --proxy-cred=PCRED HTTP proxy authentication credentials (name:password)
  --ignore-proxy     Ignore system default HTTP proxy
  --delay=DELAY      Delay in seconds between each HTTP request
  --timeout=TIMEOUT Seconds to wait before timeout connection (default 30)
```

```
MongoDB
A Tiny MongoDB Browser Shell
Just enough to scratch the surface (mini tutorial included)

for(i=0; i<10; i++) { db.scores.save({a: i, exam: 5}) };

Try that, then enter
db.scores.find();
to see if the save succeeded. Since the shell only displays 10 results at time,
you'll need to enter the 'it' command to iterate over the rest.

(enter 'next' when you're ready)
> next
5. Basic Queries
You've already tried a few queries, but let's make them more specific.
How about finding all documents where a == 2:
db.scores.find({a: 2});

Or what about documents where a > 15?
db.scores.find({a: {'$gt': 15}});
```



# JavaScript: Client(?!) Code

- The global scope of superglobals
- The prototypes of mass assignment
- The `eval()` of SQL injection
- The best way to create powerful browser apps
- The main accomplice to HTML5






# Scattered Security

- Cookies
  - Implementation by fiat, not by standard
  - A path of ornamentation, not origin
  - HTTP/HTTPS, JavaScript/non-JavaScript
- Same Origin Policy
  - Access everything, read some things
  - No privilege or all privilege, not least privilege
- HTTPS
  - Not the default
  - Relies on DNS

# HTML5 Injection


- Legacy and “non-standard” modes won’t disappear
- Look at this from the historical perspective of design and implementation
- Section 8.2 unifies parsing HTML
  - Still unsettled implementations
- Same old same origin



```
<div id=mycode style="BACKGROUND: url('java  
script:eval(document.all.mycode.expr)')"  
expr="..."></div>
```

# HTML5 Form Validation

```
<input type="email".....  
<input type="url".....  
<input type="text" required...
```



A screenshot of a web form with three input fields and a "Submit Query" button. The third field is empty and highlighted with a red border, with a black tooltip below it saying "Please fill out this field."

```
<input pattern="[A-Z]+" name="alpha_only"...
```

```
<input ... autofocus onfocus="..."
```

“Yes, you can re-add that logic server-side, but why would you want to add that kind of logic twice.” -- illustrative mailing list comment from 2011


# Shift from Implementation to Design

- Sandboxing iframes, form submission, javascript execution
  - Improving granularity of Same Origin Policy
- Cross Origin Resource Sharing
  - Better than JSONP
- Content Security Policy
  - Monitor/enforce eases adoption


# JavaScript Libraries

- Ext JS 1.1.1 to 4.0.7
  - 423 total
- jQuery 1.0.2 to 1.7.2
  - 188648 total
  - 82 with unknown or SCM rev
- Modernizer 1.1 to 2.5.3
  - 4705 total
- MooTools 1.1 to 1.4.5
  - 24808 total
- Prototype 1.3.0 to 1.7.0
  - 6433 total
- YAHOO 2.2.0 to 2.9.0
  - 7938 total
- YUI 3.0.0 to 3.4.1
  - 722 total

# jQuery




# MooTools





# YAHOO



# Web Storage API

- Transparent resource
- Privacy extraction, not SQL injection
- Better for cached content than secure storage

```
var key;
for (var i = 0, len = localStorage.length; i < len; i++) {
    key = localStorage.key(i);
    console.log(localStorage.getItem(key));
}
```

# WebSocket API

- Does not confer authentication & authorization to a protocol layered over WebSockets
- Another vector for launching DoS attacks from the browser

# Reinventing Protocol Vulnerabilities

- Prefixed strings
- Identification
- Authorization
- Information leakage
- Replay
- Spoofing
- eval()

```
Alice:Bob:5:Hello
```

```
UUID:UUID:5:Hello
```

```
SessionID:SessionID:5:Hello
```

# Here Lies Safe Links. Honest.





# Mobile: The Re-Animator

- User expectations
  - Who cares about the URL anymore? It's hardly even visible.
- Embedded browser-like features are not embedded browsers
  - Same Origin Policy enforcement
  - Certification verification
- User tracking

# Privacy: 1 Billion Reasons To Care

- Geolocation
- Supercookies
- Do-Not-Track



soylent grün ist  
Menschenfleisch!



# Ongoing Threats & Issues

- Frames
  - Sharing, nesting, moving between Origins
- Cacheing
  - Poison different origins
  - Another way to track UAs?
- Plugins
  - Outside of sandbox, outside of HTML5
  - Worse security than browsers
- Passwords

# HTML5 Is Good For You

- Beware of legacy support for and within old browsers
- Abolish plugins
- Deploy headers: X-Frame-Options, HSTS, CSP
- Data security is better

# Thank You!

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[ <http://deadliestwebattacks.com/> ]



# Recognizing Positive Security Design

- Acknowledges threats intended to counter, and those it doesn't
- Encrypted transport
- Adherence to Same Origin
- Preflight checks for authorization
- Authentication & authorization grants have short lifetimes
- Requires minimum privilege, minimum data