

# The Flaws in Hordes, The Security in Crowds



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“You see, in this world there’s two kinds of people, my friend: Those with loaded guns and those who dig. You dig.”

– Clint Eastwood, *The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly*.

“There are two kinds of spurs,  
my friend. Those that come in  
by the door; those that come in  
by the window.”

– Eli Wallach, *The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly*.

# Uneasy Alliances

“What’s the price for this vuln?”


— Bounties

“What’s the cost to fix this vuln?”

— DevOps

“What’s the value of finding vulns?”

— CSOs



Disclosure Happens

PHILOSOPHICAL  
TRANSACTIONS.

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*Munday, March 6. 1667.*

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*Some Observations of Swarms of Strange  
Insects, and the Mischiefs done by them.*

Bounties are an imperfect proxy for risk,  
where price implies impact.

\$0

—

\$15K

~\$800 avg.


\$50

XSS self,  
no auth

\$10,000


XSS any auth'd user,  
access sensitive info

Bounties are an imperfect proxy for work, where earnings often diverge from effort.





# Acceptance State of Vulns (2016)



• Bug Bounty  
• Pen Test

Duplicate

Invalid

Out of Scope

Valid




Noise increases  
cost of discovery  
and reduces  
efficiency.


# The Cost of Noise

Volume—  
Reports/day  
Percent valid


Triage—  
Time/report  
People/report



### Normalized Count per Category (2016)



# Efficiency of Vuln Discovery



-cost  
+time

-cost  
-time

Expenditure

Report  
Rate




pen test  
avg.

+cost  
+time

+cost  
-time


Vuln Discovery Cost




# Scanners

Overlaps, gaps, and ceilings in capabilities.

Fixed-cost, typically efficient, but still require triage and maintenance.




# Exhausting the Pace of Vulns...or Attention?






# The Crowd's Hoard



# The Crowd's Hoard



“We’ll always have bugs.  
Eyes are shallow.”

– Mike’s Axiom of AppSec

# BugOps vs. DevOps

Chasing bugs isn't a strategy.



As we move to  
security as code,  
code moves to  
inevitable legacy.




# Threat Modeling

DevOps exercise guided by security.

Influences design.

Informs implementation.

Increases security awareness.



Risk Reduction

“You’re not using HTTPS.”

“Use HTTPS.”


“Seriously. Please use HTTPS.”

Let’s Encrypt.






Risk vs. Findings per Pen Test (2016)




# Endemic Risk Quadrants



Bounty ranges as a proxy for SDL,  
where price implies maturity.

\$	1	Experimenting
\$	1,000	Enumerating
\$	10,000	Exterminating
\$	100,000	Extinct-ifying

# Security from Inventory




Enumerate your apps.  
Generate their  
dependency graphs.  
Identify ownership.

# Security from Crowds

Provide reasonable threat models.

Report via issue trackers.

Automate reproduction steps.



# Security from DevSecOps



**Measure** vuln discovery effort

**Monitor** risk for trends

**Illuminate** brittle design

# Thank You!

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# Questions?

@CodexWebSecurum

 Join the conversation #DevSecCon



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R —


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RStudio —

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`data.table`

`ggplot`



A cacophony of hordes.

A scrutiny of crowds.